The Professor at FGV Direito Rio and Coordinator of CTS-FGV, Luca Belli, wrote an article for MediaNama.
When India welcomes ten fellow members of BRICS to New Delhi on September 12 and 13 for the group’s 18th summit, the officially billed theme will be “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” A suitable subtitle might have been “How to build a financial system that does not rely on US intermediaries.”
The recent BRICS declarations have consistently underscored the importance of facilitating fast, low-cost, and safe cross-border payments among member states and partner nations. This includes explicit commitments to advance cross-border payment systems and foster the interoperability of financial infrastructures and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
Since assuming the bloc’s rotating chairmanship from Brazil on January 1, India has made digital public infrastructure, or DPI, for cross-border payments one of its signature priorities. High on the agenda is the operationalisation of BRICS Pay, an ambitious scheme to link existing national DPIs for payments — such as India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Brazil’s Pix system — through local-currency settlement, alongside quieter work on connecting central bank digital currencies.
Tellingly, India seems to have ruled out a single BRICS currency, a project too politically fraught and economically incoherent for a bloc that now spans the original members, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, plus six recently added and highly strategic ones: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The eleven-member grouping now accounts for almost 42% of the world’s population, 26% of global trade, and some 41% of world output at purchasing-power parity.
The instinct is understandable. A financial system routed overwhelmingly through the dollar and Western correspondent banks has become, for some governments, a source of vulnerability rather than convenience, a lesson reinforced by every new round of sanctions demonstrating the increasing weaponisation of financial interdependence.
Balancing the Potential of DPIs with their Limits
DPIs offer an appealing alternative to build “Good Digital Sovereignty”, based on open, interoperable digital rails that redistribute the power to process money and data at the local level, allowing banks and fintechs to compete and route around chokepoints, while enormously reducing fees collected by US financial intermediaries and credit card providers. India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix are held up, rightly, as proof that this can work spectacularly well at home. Both have onboarded hundreds of millions of users, squeezed fees, and broken the grip of incumbent card networks.
But there is a gap between building DPI within a country and building it between countries. Research on DPI for Payments (DPI4P) conducted under the CyberBRICS programme at Fundação Getulio Vargas’s Center for Technology and Society (CTS-FGV), in partnership with the Interledger Foundation, offers useful insights. Comparing the trajectories of UPI and Pix, the study’s central finding is unglamorous but important: the decisive ingredient in successful DPI is neither the software nor the statute; it is governance.
Consider what that means in practice. India built the National Payments Corporation of India, a not-for-profit utility operating under the Reserve Bank’s supervision, to standardise and coordinate UPI while leaving banks and apps to compete for customers. Brazil took a more centralised path, with the Banco Central do Brasil itself designing Pix, setting its rules and retaining ultimate authority over the system, while private institutions handle distribution.
The architectures differ, but the underlying logic is identical: someone with real authority must decide who operates the system, who must connect to it, who supervises it and who changes the rules when disputes or new risks emerge. Open protocols and enabling laws are necessary, but they are not remotely sufficient.
Just as important, the CyberBRICS research shows, is incentive design. A payment rail is only as useful as the number of banks, merchants and consumers who actually join it, and reaching a critical mass of participation is not automatic. Incumbents often have every reason to slow-walk infrastructure that erodes their existing franchises; smaller entrants may want in but lack the resources to integrate and scale; compliance costs weigh unevenly; and consumers see no reason to switch until enough merchants are already on board.
Both India and Brazil overcame this collective-action problem through a blend of regulatory mandate and commercial appeal, calibrated and adjusted over years. Getting that mixture right, without smothering the very competition DPI4P is meant to unleash, is a governance craft, not a coding exercise.
Towards a Multipolar Financial System?
Multiply the difficulties that India and Brazil have been able to overcome locally across eleven highly heterogeneous and sovereign jurisdictions, and the challenge for BRICS Pay comes into focus.
A cross-border link between fast-payment systems must reconcile different anti-money laundering regimes, divergent data architectures and protection rules, competing supervisory expectations, and banks that keep different hours and speak different regulatory languages.
Our research illustrates that technical interoperability projects, such as the Interledger Protocol, the open finance Project Aperta led by the Bank for International Settlements, and cross-border CBDC pilots such as the BRICS Bridge, are tackling real engineering problems, and some of that work is genuinely impressive.
But an elegant protocol solves only the plumbing. It cannot, on its own, persuade a Brazilian regulator and an Ethiopian one to trust each other’s data frameworks, convince Chinese and Indian banks to accept a common dispute-resolution mechanism, or entice 3 billion customers to embrace a new system.
The true challenge of establishing an alternative international payment system goes far beyond merely linking UPI to Pix. The real difficulty lies in building the institutional framework, backed by mutual trust, authority, and the capacity to align incentives, required to make that integration useful and impactful.
This is precisely the terrain that the BRICS Plus Digital Competition Forum will cover when it convenes for the fifth time at CTS-FGV in Rio de Janeiro on November 26 and 27, just two months after the New Delhi summit. The challenge could not be more pressing: building credible alternatives to an increasingly weaponised financial system is as much about fostering competition and digital sovereignty as it is about wiring systems together.
Multipolarity in finance is a fair and reasonable aspiration, and DPI is a genuinely useful tool for pursuing it. But tools do not govern themselves. If BRICS and countries of the Global Majority want to truly differentiate their payment options, they will need something considerably less glamorous than a shared app: they must build stable and sustainable institutional mechanisms capable of operating effectively well beyond any single summit’s news cycle.
This op-ed was originally published on Medianama on 10 September 2026 https://www.medianama.com/2026/09/223-brics-2026-dpi-payments-multipolar-financial-system/